Don’t Profile M
My friend M has a plea, in the interest of safety, that he be repeatedly selected for extended screening at airport security. If you read the comments on his post, I'm going to have to agree with Gopi on this one. I've the impression that M's post is more about the emotion of feeling secure than about minimizing the risk of terrorism given intentional trade-offs.
We can disagree about what trade-offs are "worth it" as that is a very much a personal value judgment.
But say, given that (by some miracle) everyone can agree that a forty-five minute screening delay for 25% of airline travelers is acceptable, how can that time and associated monetary penalty be best applied to achieve the goal of minimizing risk that a terrorist person get control of a plane?
The follow-up question I pose is not as subjective. It can be evaluated to some degree by scientific methods (obviously, as with many theories, double-blind clinical testing is not an option). And some highly respected researchers have concluded that race-based profiling is not most effective.
If, despite hearing that and without countervailing evidence, M wants race-based profiling because it feels better, then that's a request for security theater where we all suffer the trade-off without maximizing the benefit (time and money spent repeatedly intensely screening M is time and money repeatedly spent without any increase in safety).
The researcher in particular that has my ear is Bruce Schneier. I've been reading his Crypto-Gram for a few years now. I've recommended it. Here's his latest on the topic of Counterterrorism in Airports (May 2004) and it is directly relevant to this discussion. I think that M is reacting to the idea that over-sensitivity to charges of racism (thus the heavy reliance on machines making random choices) leads to less-than-maximally-effective security. Bruce agrees with him. But the best answer isn't necessarily the race-based profiling that M suggests.